

AN
APPENDIX
TO A
LETTER

To the Reverend
Mr. NORMAN.

In TWO PARTS.

SHEWING,

First, That the Eternal Certainty of Contingent Events cannot be proved ; but that the Contradiction to it is true and demonstrable.

Secondly, That the several Arguments, Whether from Reason or Revelation, offered by the Rev. Mr. *Bliss*, Mr. *Norman*, and the nameless Author, in Defence of it, are Weak and Inconclusive.

By SAMUEL FANCOURT.

The SECOND EDITION.

L O N D O N :

Printed for J. GRAY, at the *Cross-Keys* in the *Poultry*.
M.DCC.XXXII.

APPENDIX

LETTER

To the Reverend

Mrs. W. R. M. A. M.

IN TWO PARTS

THE FIRST PART
CONTAINS THE HISTORY OF THE
REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD
FROM 1776 TO 1789
AND THE SECOND PART
CONTAINS THE HISTORY OF THE
REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD
FROM 1789 TO 1799

BY SAMUEL JOHNSON

THE SECOND EDITION

LONDON



T H E
A P P E N D I X.

Part the First.

AT the End of my Letter to Mr. Norman I made the Controversy between us to lie chiefly in these *three Things*.

First, Whether any Events were *eternally certain*, without a *Decree* to make them so?

Secondly, Whether God *foreknew from Eternity* that all the *Sins* of the Creature *would certainly be*, and yet never decreed they *should be*?

Thirdly, Whether any Events can be both *future and contingent*, at the same time?

All which the Gentlemen, who have wrote against me, *affirm*; and I *deny*.

Upon the *last* Point in Difference, I observed, did depend the *other Two*. Because, if there be no Events *contingent*, and yet *certain*, it can be no Dispute, Whether any *contingent* Events were *eternally certain* without a *Decree*? Or, Whether they could be *known* to be so, but in the *Decree*? Since upon this

A

Sup

Supposition they will not be *certain at all*, and therefore cannot be *known* to be *certain*.

And then I concluded my Letter with these Words ; so that you see, Sir, the Debate between us may be reduced to this *single Question*,

Whether it can be true of the same Event, at the same time, both that it WILL BE, and yet MAY NOT BE ? Or, in other Words ;

Whether there be any such Things as FUTURE or CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES ?

I instanced in *Adam's Fall* ; Whether it could be both *ever true*, that he *would fall* ; and yet *really true*, that he *might have prevented* his Fall ? My Opinion was, There is a *Necessity* either to deny the *real Possibility* of his *standing* ; or to deny the *eternal Certainty* of his *Falling*. As the *Affirmative* is what they hold in *both*, the Proof lies at their Door : Yet I design'd (I told Mr. N.) an *Appendix* to my Letter, in which I should endeavour to *vince*, That *their Side* of the Question *could not be proved* ; nay, that the *Contradiction* to it was true and *demonstrable*.

p. 10. To which he replies, in an *Appendix* to his own Letter, " Let this be once made out, and " all the World must soon be of my Opinion ; " nor need I then be afraid of meeting with " any Opposition to what I call my *main Answer*."

This therefore I shall now apply my self to. To shew,

First,

First, That the *Affirmative* cannot be proved; *viz.* That a Thing can be both *future*, and yet *contingent*; Or, What *will certainly be*, and yet *may never be*.

There are *six different Ways*, whereby *Truth* may be let into the *Mind*. These are usually distributed into that of *Sense*, *Consciousness*, *Intelligence*, *Inspiration*, *Faith*, and *Reason*.

The Dictates of *SENSE* relate only to *outward* and *present* Objects, such as are *united* unto the *Organ*: But what *will be* is something *absent* and *to come*.

So again, we are *conscious* of Nothing but of what is *present* and *within us*; and so, that we *feel* by a kind of *inward Sensation*: But what *will be* is something *without us*, removed to a *Distance* from us, and is utterly incapable of such an *Union*.

INTELLIGENCE is another Way by which we come at *Truth*: And thus we judge of the Agreement or Disagreement of our *Ideas*, or of the Terms of a *Proposition*, by their own *intrinsic* and *immediate* Evidence: But that *any can prevent what will be*, is not to be known by such an *intuitive View*. The very Disputes which are about it, shew that it is *no Maxim* or *first Principle*.

For my own Part, I have view'd the *Terms* round and round again, and the *Truth* of the Proposition is so far from being *self-evident*, that the bright and convincing Evidence is wholly on the *other side*.

INSPIRATION is what, I presume, none will pretend unto. As for my self, I must, I own, utterly disclaim this *superior and heavenly* Evidence of *any* Truth. If any shou'd challenge it, and say, that it is by this Sort of Light and Impression they come to know, that some Events are both *future* and *contingent*, what *will be* and yet *may not be*, let them produce their *Credentials*, and prove the Revelation *Divine*, and the Work is done.

Then as to the Evidence of *Faith*; this, you know, arises wholly from *Testimony*. Now Testimony is either *human* or *divine*.

Human Testimony is allowed on both sides to be but *fallible*, and many times *contradictory*; and can prove *nothing certain*, much less that *contingent* Events are *certain*. Besides as *human Testimony* reaches properly unto *Facts only*, and as none, I suppose, ever pretended they have *in Fact* prevented what *will be*; so, no Certainty on *their side* of the Question can possibly arise from this Quarter.

As to the *Testimony of God*, all sides grant it to be harmonious and *infallible*; that what it declares to be *true*, cannot be *untrue*. But then for this very Reason, what it assures us *will be*, cannot but be, and *must be*; and so ceases to be *contingent*. Not to mention that Questions of *Possibility* (as Dr. Waterland observes in another Controversy) must always take Place of Enquiries into *Scripture*. So that (as a worthy Correspondent justly remarks) "it is altogether *supposing*, to say, that any
" Words

“ Words of Scripture do contain such *absolute*
 “ *Prophecies* of FUTURE EVENTS, which
 “ yet are *supposed* CONTINGENT. For
 “ till the Notion can be made appear *possible*,
 “ it is (as he goes on) *begging the Question*,
 “ to say, the *Scriptures* contain such *absolute*
 “ *Prophecies*”. And that the Possibility
 cannot be demonstrated, neither from scripture
Declarations nor from scripture *Prophecies*,
 I have, I think, sufficiently proved already in
 my Essay, p. 69, and 7. I'll venture to trans-
 scribe the Paragraphs, and cast them into the
 Margin; tho' I shou'd run the *Risque* of giv-
 ing my worthy Brother another *surfeit*, or
 provoke his Reverend and learned Friend to
 tell the World again of my SOFT ECHO'S
 or ESSAY REPEATED. *

But

* “ It is not, I freely allow, any reasonable Objection
 “ against the received Notion of the Divine Prescience or
 “ Fore-knowledge, that it is *above* our Reason. But then
 “ there is a wide Difference between being *above* and *contrary*
 “ to Reason. If Revelation doth every where affirm, that the
 “ sinful Acts of the Creature's Will, so far as it is *accountable*,
 “ are *free*, and what the Creature *might have prevented*, it can
 “ never be true from Revelation that they were *not free*, or
 “ what it *could not have prevented*. A sinful Act or Action
 “ can no more be *free* and *not free* at the same time, than the
 “ Divine Being can be *holy* and *not holy*, God and *not God*.
 “ Therefore whatever Revelation Says or *Prophecies* of such
 “ Acts or Actions, it can never amount to this; that whilst
 “ they are *free*, they are *not free*. What, to be *free*, and
 “ [yet] to be *absolutely* determined to *one side*, and that before
 “ all Worlds! To be *free*, and yet to be as unable to Act
 “ otherwise, as to make *certain* Knowledge to be *uncertain*,
 “ or to make a *true Prediction false*! Necessity it self is not
 “ less free than such a Freedom”. p. 69, 73. Essay. so in ano-
 ther Place.

“ Then

" Then as to what is insinuated concerning *Scripture Prophecies* ; I readily allow, that every *such* Prophecy is not
 " only true, but *infallibly* true, in the *Sense* of the Prophecy.
 " But then, is it not much safer for this very Reason, to sup-
 " pose, that what is *absolutely foretold*, no longer depends
 " upon the *Liberty* and *free Pleasure* of the Creature, whether
 " it shall be or no ? Or, what doth yet depend upon the
 " *Liberty* or *free Pleasure* of the Creature, whether it shall
 " exist or not, is only *conditionally foretold*. If by an *Action's*
 " being left to the *Freedom* of Man's Will, we mean, that it
 " is left unto a *Principle*, which is *absolutely unfixed* unto either
 " side as yet, but which has a *real Power* to fix it self either
 " way ; and if by the *Subject* of an *infallible Prediction* or
 " [*absolute*] Prophecy, we intend something that is *absolutely*
 " *fixed* one Way ; then we undertake to prove by *Scripture*
 " *Prophecies*, that the *same Action* or *Event* may be both *fixed*
 " and *unfixed* at the same time, or that a flat *Contradiction* is
 " true. And so at this Rate of Arguing, I and you may
 " both *widely differ* about these Things, and yet be both in the
 " *Right* and of *one Mind*". p. 7, 8. *Essay*.

But if the *Truth* of their Assertion is not to
 be discovered any of the former Ways, it must
 be by REASON, or not at all : Which teach-
 es us to draw one Truth from another by a
natural and just Method of Argument. But
 now, if this Proposition [*It is possible to pre-*
vent what will be] be the *Conclusion* ;
 what are the *Premises*, that must shew it ?
 Let them try the Experiment a thousand
 Times, and they will certainly find, the very
 Arguments which *prove* the one, *confute* the
 other. Witness these Gentlemen's Mediums
 from *absolute Predictions*, and *infallible Fore-*
knowledge *.

These

* *Vid.* Mr. N's Letter, p. 23, 24. Mr. B's Letter, p. 63,
 64, 77, 78.

These Gentlemen suppose there are *future Contingencies*; else how can God *foreknow* them? They are of Opinion, for Instance, that all those *Thoughts, Volitions, Words and Actions* for which we are *accountable*, were *free and contingent*, and yet *future*; what we had a *Power to prevent*, tho' they *certainly would be*. Now the Topics from *Reason* to make out this *marvelous Power*, must (I conceive) be some one or more of these *four*. Either they can shew that **THE PREVENTING WHAT WILL BE** *has been done*, or that it *will be done*, or *how it may be done*, or at least can assign some *valuable Reasons*, why such a Power *should be communicated* to Man.

But all, I presume, are agreed that none *have* done it. And yet if every *free Agent* had, in ten thousand Instances, the *Power*; is it not a little strange that not one of all the *Myriads* in the *Universe* should take it in his Head to *exert* this Power? If Mr. N. has any *Atchievements* of such a Kind to boast of; I hope he will not say, *he is but ONE of the many THOUSANDS, who have done the like*. He is, I durst aver, the *only* one (excepting, perhaps, his Reverend and learned Friend) who *ever attempted* to perform such Wonders.

But before we will allow them the Advantage of the old Proverb,

What *has been done*, *may be done*: Mr. B. and Mr. N. **HAVE prevented what WILL BE**: Therefore what *will be*, *may be prevented*

vented. Before we allow it, it is but reasonable (I say) that the *Evidence* of the *Facts* should bear some *Proportion* to the *Greatness* of the *Exploits*. It is but fit, they should certify the *Time* and *Place*, *when* and *where* they acquit themselves with so much *Dexterity*; and the rather, because to *prevent* what *will be*, is to make that it *will not be*; and then it would be *true* that it *will be*, and *true* that it *will not be*; *true* and *not true*.

As none *have* done it, so it is, I'm confident, beyond the *most sanguine* Constitution to hope it ever *will be* done. Every Man stands convinced in his own Breast, that what *will be*, is no more to be prevented, than what *must be*. Was he told, it is a *future Contingency*, what *may not be*, tho' it *will be*; up, and try to *prevent* it. Would he not either *laugh* or *stom*? Where is the Man that looks upon the most valuable Interest, as worth a Straw, that really depends upon this magical *Power* to *prevent* what *will be*?

Was it possible to be done, there must, doubtless, be a certain *Modus* or *Manner* for the doing it. But none ever had the Vanity to teach *HOW* it may be done. And yet if every *free Agent* *has* the Power, is it not a little marvellous, that not one of them should be either *conscious* of such a Power, or of the *way how* it may be *exercis'd*? If these Gentlemen have hit upon the *Secret*, tho' it mayn't be advisable to impart the *Whole* of such a *beneficial* Mystery to the World; yet to communicate

municate *so much*, as may convince others, they have *actually* found this *Philosopher's Stone*, is but expedient, was it only to induce Mankind to bid up for the Knowledge of so surprizing an Art; How in the twinkling of an Eye, to turn what *will be* into what *will not be*.

As no one knows *how* to prevent what *will be*; neither can any shew, what *valuable Purposes* such a Power can serve. For after all our boasted Abilities to prevent such Events, yet still they *will be* notwithstanding, altogether the same, as if there had been no such Power to hinder them. Let it be once true that the unhappy Creature *will Sin* and be miserable; alas, what will his *Power to prevent* them avail! His *Sin* and *Damnation* are as *unavoidable* now, as if the contrary had been never so *impossible*. For being now known that they *will be*, they now *must be*, must infallibly be, these Gentlemen themselves being judges *. I do but think, with what hellish Shrieks and dispairing Cries this wretched World wou'd be filled, if Men were persuaded that all their Hopes of winning HEAVEN, or *escaping the Vengeance of ETERNAL FIRE*, did really depend upon the feeble *Power of preventing what will be*! Now what End the *Belief* of such a Power can serve, [which no Man ever *did*, or ever *will use*; that we

* Vid. Mr. N.'s Letter, p. 33. Mr. B.'s Letter, p. 63.

know not *how* to use, and which cannot possibly serve any *beneficial* Purposes unto them that have it,] I cannot imagin, unless it be to make the *Head* giddy with gazing upon the *airy Phantom*, or the *Body* lean with *wondering* at it.

Having thus shewn, That the *Affirmative* of the Question *cannot be proved*; I shall now make it appear, That the *Contradiction* to it is *true* and *demonstrable*; Viz. *That it is impossible to prevent what will be*: Or, (according to the Title of my Letter) *That what will be, must be*; Or, *That future Contingencies are no Contingencies*.

This being the *Hinge* upon which the *whole Controversy* doth turn, the Reader will bear with me, if I put my *first Argument* into *Form*: By which means the *Sophistry*, if any, will be more easily *detected*; Or, if my Reasoning be *just* and *conclusive*, the *Force* of it (at least to Men of Letters) will be more clearly *discerned*. And this I shall the rather do, not only in Imitation of Mr. B's *Example*, who begins with a *Syllogism*, but because as Mr. N. *impatiently expects* my Arguments, so he hopes I will remember that *nothing but Demonstration* will, as the case now stands, be *accepted*. The Point to be proved, is,

That what *will be, must be*; and

Therefore is *not contingent*.

My Argument is This;

What *can't* be prevented, *must be*:

But what *will be, can't* be prevented:

Therefore what *will be, must be*.

The

The *Major* is *self-evident* : The *Minor* I prove thus ;

If it be a *Contradiction* to *prevent* what *will* be, what *will* be *can't* be prevented : But it is a *Contradiction* to *prevent* what *will* be :

Therefore what *will* be, *can't* be prevented. Here again it is only the *Antecedent* that needs any Proof, which I thus demonstrate ;

To suppose it both *true* that an Event *will* be, and yet *not true* that it *will* be, is a *Contradiction*.

But to *prevent* what *will* be, supposes it both *true* that it *will* be, and *not true* that it *will* be :

Therefore to *prevent* what *will* be, is a *Contradiction*.

The *Truth* of the *Minor*, if it needs any further Evidence, may be thus made out ;

To *prevent* what *will* be, is to suppose *first* that it is *true* that it *will* be ; (otherwise you don't *prevent* what *will* be) and then that it is *not true* that it *will* be : For if you *prevent* what *will* be, it is *now* true that it *will not* be. And if it be *now* true that it *will not* be, it is no longer *true* that it *will* be.

Thus you see, Sir, it is strictly demonstrable, that *what will be, must be* ; or, that *future Contingencies* are no *Contingencies* : And therefore that such *Events* as are both *future* and *contingent*, are a mere *Chimera*, a *Non-entity*, a *Contradiction in in adjecto*, Ideas that

Destroy one another, are no Object of Knowledge ; and consequently that the *foreknowledge* these Gentlemen contend for, which supposes that an Event *will* be, and *Liberty* which supposes it *may not* be, cannot be adjoined without a manifest *Contradiction*. Since both sides are agreed, if *contingent* Events be *not certain*, it is not *Knowledge*, much less any *Perfection* in Knowledge to view them as *certain*.

Besides, I would ask ; Why *can't* we *recall* what's *past* ? But because to *recall* it, is to make it *not past* ; and so it would be both *past* and *not past*. Why *can't* we *hinder* what *is* ? But because to *hinder* it, is to make that it *is not* ; and so it would be *true* that it *is*, and yet *true* that it *is not*. Why *can't* we *do* the thing that is *impossible* ? But because to *do* it, is to prove that it is *possible* ; and so it would be both *possible* and *impossible*. For the same Reason it is, that none *can prevent* what *will* be ; because to *prevent* it, is to make that it *will not* be ; and so *true* and *not true* that it *will be*.

Again, what *will be* is *certain*, by their own Acknowledgment . Now, if what is

* " What Appearance of a Contradiction, says Mr. N. is there in supposing that some Things " might be *hypothetically* " necessary (or *certain*, as I should rather chuse to call them) " and yet at the same time *contingent*, Append. p. 12." So Mr. B. pag. 75. " This Foreknowledge denotes the *Certainty* of the Event, that the Creature *will* sin." Again, p. " An Action foreknown, will ——— certainly ——— " come to pass."

certain may be prevented, then what is *certain* may deceive us; and so there is no *sure* Dependence upon any Thing. Don't they strike at all Religion at once, whether *revealed* or *natural*, and let in a Flood of *Scepticism* upon us, when they contend that what is *certain*, may not be?

What God *foreknows* will be, can't be prevented; (they themselves allow *.) And indeed if the *WILL might* or *could* incline otherwise than God *forejaw*, his *Fore-knowledge* (as has been observed from Mr. *Clarkson*, Essay, p. 78.) would not be *infallible*; for that excludes not only *actual Error*, but a *Possibility* of it. But what *will be*, God *foreknows* will be, by the Confession of both Parties: Therefore what *will be*, can't be prevented.

"*Foreknowledge*, in the Order of our Ideas, (as Mr. *B.* rightly observes) should be considered as *subsequent* to the *Truth* and *Reality* of the Event which is the Object of it; to that—it is, says he, only because it will be, that it is foreknown." p. 65. So Mr. *N.* "A thing doth not, because it is known, come to pass; but because it was to come

* 'An Event, says Mr. *N.* because it is *foreknown*, must infallibly be." *L. t.* p. 33. 'The Perfection of God's Knowledge, and his Infallibility, says Mr. *B.* make it a moral Impossibility that he should be deceived. And by consequence an Action foreknown by God will as certainly come to pass, as if it was pre-determin'd absolutely; or so, as that in the physical, impulsive Sense it *must* and *cannot* but be, p. 18.

to pass, therefore it was foreknown". *Letter*, pag. 33. Now I argue thus; If the *Truth* and *Reality* be, that the Event *will be*; or, that the Thing *was to come to pass*; then a *Power* to prevent it, is a *Power* to turn *Truth* into *Falshood*, and *Reality* into an *Ens rationis*, or what *was* to come to pass, into what *shall never come to pass*.

Once more; That a *physical Necessity* destroys the *Freedom* of the Will, and is inconsistent with *Liberty*, these Gentlemen themselves allow *. But the *hypothetical Necessity* they contend for †, is to all Intents and Purposes, in this Controversy, the same with a *physical Necessity*, and destroys the *Freedom* of the Will as much; (or, which is all one, *supposes* it as much destroyed) and consequently is as inconsistent with *Liberty*. For, as what we *promise conditionally*, the *Condition* being *perform'd*, binds as much as if we had promised it *absolutely*; so what is hypothetically or *conditionally necessary*, the *Condition* being *supposed*, is as necessary *now*, as if it had been *absolutely necessary*; (for, by a *physical* they must mean an *absolute Necessity*, when they oppose it to what is an *hypothetical* or *conditional Necessity*.) Thus; Is it true? If God be *just*, a Day of Judgment is *necessary*: Then, on *Supposition* that he be *just*, a Day of Judgment is now as necessary,

* *Mr. B. p. 60. Mr. N. Let. pag. 30.*

† *Mr. B. p. 62. Mr. N. Let. p. 34.*

as if it had been in the most *absolute*, or (what they call) *physical* Sense *necessary*. Besides, what can we infer from their *physical* Necessity of Actions, against the *Freedom* of the Will, more than this, now they *must be*, they *cannot but be*? Why, the Necessity that may be drawn from God's *eternal Foreknowledge* of our Actions, which they plead for, and call *hypothetical*, implies as much, *viz.* That the *Actions* thus *foreknown* will as certainly come to pass, as if in the *physical, impulsive Sense* they *must be*, and *cannot but be*. So that upon both Suppositions the Liberty of the Creature to *this* or *that*; to *act* or *not act*, is *equally gone*. Mr. B.
p. 78.

But it may be said, if *future Contingencies* be a *Contradiction*; if it can't be true of the same Event, at the same time, both that it *will be*, and yet *may not be*; if *both can't* be true, which of them *is* true, with respect to the *accountable* Thoughts, Volitions, Words and Actions of the rational Creature? Must we give up their *Contingency*, or must we give up their *Futurity* or *Certainty*? I have chosen the *latter*, and maintain that the *free* Actions &c. of the Creature were not always *future*, what *would certainly* be, but *only possible* from Eternity, what *might* or *might not be*; and consequently, that God view'd them only as possible, and not as future. " For if these
" two Things were really inconsistent, and
" cou'd by no means be reconciled; it wou'd
" follow, (say the greatest Advocates for that
" Notion)

“ Notion) not, that *Mens Actions were not*
 “ *free* ; (for that wou'd destroy *all* Religion,
 “ and take away *all* the moral Attributes of
 “ God at once ;) But on the other Side, it
 “ wou'd follow that *such free Actions as*
 “ *Mens* are, and without which rational
 “ Creatures cou'd not be rational Creatures,
 “ were not the Objects of the Divine Fore-
 “ knowledge ” [or were not future.] “ And
 “ in such Case, it wou'd be no more a Dimi-
 “ nution of God's *Omniscience*, say they, not
 “ to *know* things impossible and contradictory
 “ to be known; then it is a Diminution of
 “ his *Omnipotence*, not to be able to *do* things
 “ impossible, and contradictory to be done ”.*

Essay, p.
 30, 31.

And were we to err in this matter, it were
 infinitely more safe (even in our fallen State)
 to err *on the side* of Liberty than *against* it.
 For to entertain my Reader again with
 what Mr. *Bliss* calls a *soft Eccho* out of my
 Essay (for who wou'd invent *new* Arguments
 for Invention sake, when *old* Arguments lie *un-*
answered;) if we are *not free*, but *wholly pas-*
sive, it can do us no hurt to *think* ourselves free.
 What I am under a *Necessity* to *do* and *be*, I
 shall *do* and *be* notwithstanding; nay, this
 very *Belief* that I am *free*, will be as *necessary*
 as any Thing else, with all the afflictive
 Thoughts that arise from an *apprehended abuse*
 of my Freedom. But if we are *really free*,
 and think we have *no Freedom*, it may do us

* See Dr. S. Clarke's *Sermons* published by Dr. J. Clarke, vol. 1,
 pag; 260, 261.

much

much Hurt, it may turn to our infinite Hurt, as it may tempt us to neglect that Part upon which Life and Immortality depend. Ay, it may not only prove an Injury to *ourselves*, but to the *World* about us, whilst those valuable Talents, which were given for the *publick Good*, are either wickedly imploy'd against it, or slothfully buried, for want of a vigorous and timely Resistance against the Flesh, the World, and the Devil: Besides, the *abuse of our Liberty* in pleading against the *Principle of Liberty*, may betray the unthinking World with which we live, into an indolent and ruinous Stupidity, in the Matters of eternal Life, whilst they are led to commit the infinite Concernments of their Souls to the immediate and *sole* Conduct of the Spirit in the neglect of that Part upon which his promised Help and the Success of the whole depend. To mention nothing here of the innumerable temporal Advantages that particular Persons, private Families, or more publick Societies may lose; or the temporal Evils they may suffer by the unvirtuous Inactivity, or vicious Compliances, which the *Belief* of such a mechanick passive Principle, as the want of Liberty in the Creature, may introduce into the rational World.

The Case standing thus, it may'nt be amiss to look into the Arguments, whether from *Reason* or *Revelation*, which have induced so many learned Persons to give into this *absurd* and *contradictory* Notion, *The Certainty of contingent Events*; or that an Action may be *certainly future*, and yet *free*. C N. B.

N.B. The Publication of the *Second Part* of this *Appendix*, I have deferr'd a while, in expectation of Mr. MILLAR's further Thoughts upon the Subject of the Divine Omniscience; that it might be as *complete* and *decisive* an Answer, as possible, to all the Arguments that have been offered, from either of the above Topics. There I shall have an Opportunity to collect, to state, and refute their most plausible Reasonings; and particularly to lay open the Fallacy of these that follow. As when they argue,

1st, That since it is in Fact true that such and such Actions *have been*, it must therefore have been *ever true*, that they *would be*.

2^{dly}, That to foreknow an Event any Time *before* it comes to pass, is attended with as great Difficulties, as an eternal Foreknowledge of it.

3^{dly}, If all Events be not eternally certain, some Events must depend upon Will and Pleasure.

4^{thly}, That the Knowledge of a perfect Being cannot encrease, tho' the Truths that are known be still encreasing.

5^{thly}, That tho' an Event cannot be contingent and necessary, yet it may be contingent and certain.

6^{thly}, That these Propositions, *It is true that such an Event will be*; *It is true that such an Event will not be*, are as really contradictory, as these; *It is true, it will be*; *it is not true, it will be*.

7^{thly}, That God cannot govern the moral World with Wisdom, unless all their moral Actions were eternally certain.

8^{thly}, That an Event may be contingent in itself, and yet not so to the Divine Mind.

9^{thly}, That because we may know IN TIME, what another does, and yet not will it; therefore God may know FROM ETERNITY what Creatures do in Time, tho' he never decreed it; and tho' there was then nothing but his own Decree to know it from.

10^{thly}, That the Supposition of future Contingencies leaves the Divine Perfections as unspotted, as if no such Contingencies were supposed.

Such like Subtilties from the Topic of Reason, besides several others that pretend to Revelation, the Reader will find particularly discuss'd in this *Second Part*, and their Sophistry exposed: which will well deserve the Consideration of all such, as desire to go to the Bottom of this nice, difficult, and important Subject.